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Navin Kartik
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Cited by
Year
Strategic communication with lying costs
N Kartik
Review of Economic Studies 76 (4), 1359-1395, 2009
8022009
Credulity, lies, and costly talk
N Kartik, M Ottaviani, F Squintani
Journal of Economic theory 134 (1), 93-116, 2007
5282007
Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion
S Hurkens, N Kartik
Experimental Economics 12 (2), 180-192, 2009
4372009
Selecting Cheap‐Talk Equilibria
Y Chen, N Kartik, J Sobel
Econometrica 76 (1), 117-136, 2008
3622008
Signaling character in electoral competition
N Kartik, RP McAfee
The American economic review 97 (3), 852-870, 2007
3402007
Opinions as incentives
YK Che, N Kartik
Journal of Political Economy 117 (5), 815-860, 2009
3192009
Optimal contracts for experimentation
M Halac, N Kartik, Q Liu
The Review of Economic Studies 83 (3), 1040-1091, 2016
2242016
Contests for experimentation
M Halac, N Kartik, Q Liu
Journal of Political Economy 125 (5), 1523-1569, 2017
1962017
Pandering to Persuade
YK Che, W Dessein, N Kartik
American Economic Review 103 (1), 47-79, 2013
1652013
Muddled information
N Kartik, A Frankel
Journal of Political Economy 127 (4), 1739-1776, 2017
141*2017
Implementation with evidence
N Kartik, O Tercieux
Theoretical Economics 7, 323-355, 2012
1382012
Herding with collective preferences
SN Ali, N Kartik
Economic Theory 51 (3), 1-26, 2011
137*2011
Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
N Kartik, O Tercieux, R Holden
Games and Economic Behavior 83, 284-290, 2014
1002014
Improving information from manipulable data
A Frankel, N Kartik
Journal of the European Economic Association 20 (1), 79-115, 2022
712022
Information aggregation in standing and ad hoc committees
SN Ali, JK Goeree, N Kartik, TR Palfrey
The American Economic Review 98 (2), 181-186, 2008
702008
A note on cheap talk and burned money
N Kartik
Journal of Economic Theory 136 (1), 749-758, 2007
68*2007
Informative cheap talk in elections
N Kartik, R Van Weelden
The Review of Economic Studies 86 (2), 755-784, 2019
662019
Information revelation and pandering in elections
N Kartik, F Squintani, K Tinn
arXiv preprint arXiv:2406.17084, 2024
65*2024
Investment in concealable information by biased experts
N Kartik, FX Lee, W Suen
The RAND Journal of Economics 48 (1), 24-43, 2017
622017
Information transmission with almost-cheap talk
N Kartik
Unpublished Manuscript, University of California San Diego, 2005
61*2005
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Articles 1–20