| Fair and truthful mechanisms for dichotomous valuations M Babaioff, T Ezra, U Feige Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 35 (6), 5119-5126, 2021 | 113 | 2021 |
| Prophet matching with general arrivals T Ezra, M Feldman, N Gravin, ZG Tang Mathematics of Operations Research 47 (2), 878-898, 2022 | 112* | 2022 |
| Fair-share allocations for agents with arbitrary entitlements M Babaioff, T Ezra, U Feige Mathematics of Operations Research 49 (4), 2180-2211, 2024 | 62 | 2024 |
| Combinatorial contracts P Dütting, T Ezra, M Feldman, T Kesselheim 2021 IEEE 62nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS …, 2022 | 60 | 2022 |
| Multi-agent contracts P Dütting, T Ezra, M Feldman, T Kesselheim Proceedings of the 55th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 1311-1324, 2023 | 51 | 2023 |
| On best-of-both-worlds fair-share allocations M Babaioff, T Ezra, U Feige International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, 237-255, 2022 | 43 | 2022 |
| Pricing multi-unit markets T Ezra, M Feldman, T Roughgarden, W Suksompong ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) 7 (4), 1-29, 2020 | 24* | 2020 |
| Prophets and Secretaries with Overbooking I Nehama, M Feldman, T Ezra Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2018 | 20* | 2018 |
| Settling the communication complexity of combinatorial auctions with two subadditive buyers T Ezra, M Feldman, E Neyman, I Talgam-Cohen, M Weinberg 2019 IEEE 60th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS …, 2019 | 18 | 2019 |
| A general framework for endowment effects in combinatorial markets T Ezra, M Feldman, O Friedler ACM SIGecom Exchanges 18 (2), 38-44, 2020 | 17 | 2020 |
| Tight Bounds for Secretary Matching in General Graphs T Ezra, M Feldman, N Gravin, Z Tang Mathematics of Operations Research, 2024 | 16* | 2024 |
| On the (in) approximability of combinatorial contracts T Ezra, M Feldman, M Schlesinger arXiv preprint arXiv:2311.18425, 2023 | 16 | 2023 |
| “Who is Next in Line?” On the Significance of Knowing the Arrival Order in Bayesian Online Settings T Ezra, M Feldman, N Gravin, ZG Tang Proceedings of the 2023 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms …, 2023 | 13* | 2023 |
| Multi-agent combinatorial contracts P Dütting, T Ezra, M Feldman, T Kesselheim Proceedings of the 2025 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms …, 2025 | 12 | 2025 |
| Pandora's problem with combinatorial cost B Berger, T Ezra, M Feldman, F Fusco Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 273-292, 2023 | 8 | 2023 |
| Prophet inequalities via the expected competitive ratio T Ezra, R Reiffenhauser, M Russo, A Tsigonias-Dimitriadis, S Leonardi ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 2022 | 7 | 2022 |
| The importance of knowing the arrival order in combinatorial Bayesian settings T Ezra, T Garbuz International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, 256-271, 2023 | 6 | 2023 |
| On a competitive secretary problem with deferred selections T Ezra, M Feldman, R Kupfer arXiv preprint arXiv:2007.07216, 2020 | 5 | 2020 |
| Choosing behind the veil: Tight bounds for identity-blind online algorithms T Ezra, M Feldman, ZG Tang Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 136-158, 2024 | 4 | 2024 |
| Pandora’s problem with deadlines B Berger, T Ezra, M Feldman, F Fusco Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 38 (18), 20337 …, 2024 | 4 | 2024 |
Michal FeldmanProfessor of Computer Science, Tel Aviv UniversityVerified email at post.tau.ac.il
